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This essay is a response to Julian Savulescu’s objections to
the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion
published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, June 2002. Firstly,
Savulescu’s claim that the future of value argument has
implausible implications is considered. The author argues
that the argument does not have these implications.
Secondly, properties which, according to Savulescu, could
underwrite the wrongness of killing and that are acquired
only after implantation, are considered. It is argued that none
of these properties is an adequate basis for the distinction
between wrongful and permissible killing.
T
he future of value argument for the immorality of
abortion claims that the best explanation for the
wrongness of killing children and adults is that killing
us deprives us of our futures of value. Our futures of value
consist of all of the goods of life that we would have
experienced had we not been killed. Fetuses have futures like
ours. Therefore, (given some defensible assumptions) abor-
tion is seriously wrong on almost all occasions.1
Julian Savulescu has offered numerous objections to the
future of value argument.2 He points out that ‘‘abortion and
embryo destruction prevent a future of value, but that does
not make them wrong’’. Savulescu notes that many actions
prevent the existence of a future of value. An animal’s future
has value, but we do not believe that it is seriously wrong to
kill animals. There is value in works of art, but an artist may
have good reasons for not creating a work of art if such
creation would prevent her from adequately caring for her
children. ‘‘On a future of value argument, killing a fetus is
like failing to conceive a baby’’. Failure to clone a skin cell
prevents the existence of a future of value, yet we do not
believe that it is wrong not to clone skin cells.
Savulescu’s objections to the future of value argument can
be understood as a dilemma. Either the argument entails that
actions, such as a successful attempt not to conceive a child,
are as seriously wrong as the murder of an adult or child or it
entails that many actions (such as abortion) are, at most,
only minor wrongs (like, perhaps, choosing not to create
a work of art) whose apparent wrongness easily can be
overridden by other considerations.2 On the first alternative
the argument entails conclusions that are absurd. On the
second alternative the argument does not show that
abortions are seriously wrong. On either alternative the
future of value argument is unsuccessful in showing that
abortion is seriously wrong on almost all occasions.
A response to these objections requires an explanation
both of the nature of a future of value and of the motivation
behind the future of value theory. Before this theory app-
eared on the philosophical scene the debate in philosophy
over the abortion issue appeared to have reached a stalemate.
Typically critics of abortion argued that as fetuses are clearly
human beings, it is wrong to kill them, for we all agree that
it is seriously wrong to kill human beings on almost all
occasions. Abortion’s defenders normally argued that since
clearly fetuses are not people, they fail to possess the crucial
property that underwrites the serious wrongness of killing
adults and children on almost all occasions. The future of
value argument is based on the claim that neither abortion’s
defenders nor abortion’s critics had offered adequate theories
of the serious wrongness of killing (Marquis,1 p 189). If we do
not have an adequate understanding of what makes it wrong
to kill us—that is, individuals in cases where the serious
wrongness of killing is uncontroversial—how could we
understand whether it is seriously wrong to end the life of
a fetus?
According to the future of value theory, killing adults and
children is wrong because it deprives them of all of the goods
of life that they otherwise would have experienced. This
seems right because it makes killing a harm, and not only a
harm, but one of the most serious harms that can be inflicted
on someone. This fits with the attitudes of people who face
premature death. It does not rely on an illicit inference from a
biological property (being a human being) or from a
psychological property (being a person) to a moral property
(having the right to life). According to the future of value
theory, fetuses can be victims of abortion in exactly the same
way as adults or children can be victims of murder.
RESPONSES TO SAVULESCU’S OBJECTIONS
Because this theory offers an account of how killing harms a
victim, an action that the theory claims is wrong will affect a
victim (Marquis,1 p 189). Therefore, the future of value
theory does not imply that it is wrong not to create things of
value, for in such cases there may be no victim. It does not
(apparently) imply that deciding not to conceive a child is
wrong, for (apparently) there is no victim in this situation
either. It does not imply that it is wrong to kill non-human
animals. Fetuses have futures that are so much like ours that
they contain everything that ours contain. The futures of
(non-human) animals do not. The future of value theory does
not tell us whether non-human animal futures are suffi-
ciently different as to make it permissible to kill such
animals. Note the discussion of this in my paper (Marquis,1
p 191).
How some of Savulescu’s objections have gone astray can
be explained. Many of Savulescu’s claims concerning the
future of value argument are quite correct. It is true that
abortion does prevent a future of value. It is also true that all
deprivations of a future of value are preventions of a future of
value. According to the future of value theory, all depriva-
tions of a future of value are seriously wrong on almost all
occasions. It does not follow, however, that, on the future of
value theory, all preventions of a future of value are seriously
wrong on almost all occasions. (This is because ‘‘All As are
Bs’’ and ‘‘All As are Cs’’ do not entail ‘‘All Bs are Cs’’.) What
is needed for the wrong of killing is an individual who is
deprived of a future of value. Mere preventions provide us
neither with the requisite victim, nor with a deprivation.
Savulescu’s better objections to the future of value
argument concern cases that seem to involve victims. He
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claims the argument implies it would be wrong to deprive a
sperm and an unfertilised ovum (hereafter a UFO) of a future
of value. He also claims it would be wrong to deprive any
arbitrarily chosen human cell of a future of value by not
cloning it. If Savulescu is correct, then, because of these
implausible implications, the future of value argument must
be rejected.
Consider first the sperm and UFO objection. The future of
value of which I would be deprived by being killed is the
valuable life of a later stage of me, of the same individual that
I am now. Killing me deprives me only of my future of value,
not your future of value, nor anyone else’s. Accordingly, if my
parents had failed to conceive me, their inaction would have
been wrong only if the sperm and the UFO that were my
precursors were earlier stages of the same individual I am
now. If that sperm and that UFO were earlier stages of me,
then each of them would be the same individual as I. If each
of them were the same individual as I, then, since identity is
transitive, that sperm and that UFO were identical. They were
not. It follows that the future of value theory does not imply
that if my parents had failed to conceive me, their inaction
would have been wrong. This argument can be generalised to
show that the future of value theory does not imply that
either contraception or decisions not to conceive are wrong.3
Savulescu’s failure to clone objection requires a more
elaborate response. On the future of value view (and accord-
ing to ordinary people) to kill someone is to deprive that
individual of a future of value. To deprive someone of a future
of value is to harm her. To harm her is to make her worse off
than she otherwise would be or should be. Something about
the victim is required to underwrite the truth of the claim
about how things would have or should have gone for the
victim if she had not been killed. Such a victim would have
lived a longer life that she would have valued. Our conception
of this longer life is well entrenched. It is based on our
biological understanding of the natural history of a human
organism, on the understanding we gain at an early age from
contact with parents, grandparents, and older acquaintances
of a natural and full human life span, and on a conception of
a human life span found in literature. This comparison is
what makes premature death a deprivation rather than a mere
non-occurrence of the events of a life. Both ‘‘deprivation’’
and ‘‘harm’’ are implicitly comparative terms.
The nature of a skin cell (or other differentiated human
cell) underwrites neither an entrenched notion of a natural
human life span, nor an entrenched notion of any other life
that is valuable to the skin cell. Therefore, a skin cell is not
deprived of anything by a failure to clone. There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, cloning involves destruction of a
differentiated cell by removing its nucleus and inserting it
into a germ cell from which the nucleus has been removed.
Therefore, the differentiated cell has not been harmed by not
being cloned, for if it were cloned, then it would have ceased
to exist. Indeed, failing to clone it preserves it! Secondly,
suppose that we waive the first point and suppose that
cloning transforms a differentiated cell into an undifferen-
tiated cell. The nature of differentiated cells is to perform the
specialised tasks that differentiated cells perform. Their
natural history is not affected by their not being transformed
into something else. Compare killing a human being,
whether that human being is a fetus, a child, or an adult.
Her natural history is truncated by being killed. Therefore,
the failure to clone objection can also be rebutted.
Savulescu might argue that all these responses fail to
recognise the following distinction. He says: ‘‘There is a
difference between killing or destroying something and
preventing something from coming into existence. Pre-
venting something coming into existence denies a future of
value, as does destruction. But they are not the same’’.2
Savulescu’s remark makes both too few distinctions and
too many. I exist at present. My future of value does not.
Therefore, they are different. Now ask what has been
eliminated if someone kills me at the present moment. My
killer has not destroyed the past stages of me, for no one can
change the past. Whether the present stage of me exists or
not does not (by itself) matter to me because the present is
instantaneous. What matters is that my killer would
eliminate future stages of me. He would prevent my future
of value from occurring. Therefore, not all preventions are
equal. Some preventions are what we would call ‘‘destruc-
tions’’ and some are not.
SOME ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS
Savulescu also defends his criticism of the future of value
argument by suggesting that at least one of several
alternative accounts of the wrongness of killing is superior
to it. Savulescu believes that there is a ‘‘property of killing’’
that fetuses and embryos lack, but that people have. Killing a
human being is presumptively seriously wrong only if a
human has acquired that property, which Savulescu calls
‘‘p’’. What is p? According to Savulescu: ‘‘We need not settle
on what p is. Property p surely exists’’. Savulescu claims that
at least one of four candidates for p is reasonable.
Savulescu believes that a property proposed by Mark
Brown may be a reasonable candidate for p.4 Thus it may be
the case that ‘‘Killing is wrong because it deprives a self
conscious being of a self represented future of value’’.2 He
also believes that a property proposed by Michael Tooley5 and
Peter Singer6 may be a reasonable candidate for p. Thus it
may be the case that ‘‘Killing is wrong because it frustrates
the desire to live of a self conscious being’’.2 A third candidate
for p is having a functioning brain.2 A fourth candidate for p
is having the capacity for consciousness.2
Will any of Savulescu’s candidates survive critical scrutiny?
Consider Brown’s candidate. In two essays in this journal I
have offered what I still take to be good arguments for
believing that Brown’s view is multiply ambiguous and that
any version of Brown’s view is an inadequate account of a
serious right to life.7 8 Savulescu offers no objection whatso-
ever to these arguments. Failing that, I see no reason to
believe that Brown’s property is a reasonable candidate for p.
Consider now the Singer/Tooley view. The point of the
search for p, of course, is to find a property the absence of
which renders the killing of a human being morally per-
missible and which is absent in fetuses. The problem with
taking a self conscious being’s desire to live as the basis for
one’s right to life is that absence of this property permits too
much killing. Tooley himself described such difficulties in his
landmark 1972 essay. Consider the case of an individual
suffering from depression who says that he wishes he were
dead, or, for that matter, who says sincerely that he sees no
point in living. Consider the case of someone who is not a self
conscious being because she is temporarily unconscious and
therefore not conscious of anything including her own self.
Consider the case of an individual who ‘‘may permit someone
to kill him because he had been convinced that if he allows
himself to be sacrificed to the gods he will be gloriously
rewarded in a life to come’’ (Tooley,5 pp 47–8). Killing such
people is clearly wrong. Therefore, the Singer/Tooley candi-
date for p is not reasonable. Indeed, as the interested reader
will see, Tooley has (on pages 109–12 of his book) given up
this view because of these problems with it.9
An attentive reader might wonder if the Singer/Tooley view
could be salvaged by a minimal alteration so that our can-
didate for p is, instead of the actual desire to live, the con-
ceptual capacity to desire to live. This alteration does appear
promising, both because it underwrites a defence of abortion
and because it is not subject to the above counterexamples.
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John Harris apparently has such a view in mind when he
writes: ‘‘My suggestion then is that if we ask ‘which lives are
valuable in the ultimate sense, which lives are the lives of
persons?’, the answer will be ‘the lives of any and every
creature whether organic or not, who is capable of valuing
his/her or its own existence’’’.10
Will this do? The plausibility of giving an account of the
wrongness of killing in terms of one’s actual desire for, or
actual valuing of, life is that we do believe that we ought to
respect the desires, or the wishes, or the values, or the
interests of others. The trouble is that we do not, in general,
believe that is it wrong to deprive someone of something that
she is merely capable of desiring or valuing, but does not in
fact desire or value, or care about, or have an interest in. I am
conceptually capable of desiring to keep the trash that I set
out for the trash man each week, but that creates not the
slightest presumption whatsoever that it is wrong for the
trash man to deprive me of it. Tooley defends the intuitive
plausibility of his view in terms of actual desires, not in terms
of desires that one merely has the capacity to have (Tooley,5
p 44). When Harris offers a reason for his view, he talks of
actual valuing, not the mere capacity to value. So Harris says:
‘‘Persons who want to live are wronged by being killed
because they are thereby deprived of something they value.
Persons who do not want to live are not on this account
harmed’’ (Harris,10 p 307). Thus the problem with the mini-
mal alteration of the desire view that we are considering is
that the price that is paid for accommodating the counter-
examples to the unaltered view is giving up the intuitive
plausibility of the original view. Accordingly, there are
reasons for rejecting both views.
Could the time at which a human organism begins to
possess p be the time at which fetal brain function begins?
Savulescu defends this candidate by asserting that: ‘‘Death is
defined currently in terms of brain death’’ and ‘‘If we cease to
exist when our brain dies, we only begin to exist when our
brains start to function’’.2 This is not an occasion for a dis-
cussion of the correct definition of death. Assume Savulescu
is right about that (although I do not think he is). Even so,
there are at least two problems with this candidate for p. The
first is that it is possible to argue that our brain begins to
function so early in fetal development that this candidate
for p will justify very little, if any, abortion. A little cellular
specialisation at the cephalic end of the embryonic neural
tube arguably could qualify. The second is that death is
defined is terms of the irreversible loss of function. Nothing
corresponds to this at the beginning of life. Plainly the mere
absence of function is not going to do, for the mere absence of
function is not sufficient for death.
Savulescu’s final candidate for p is the acquisition of
consciousness. Consciousness begins at about 20 weeks of
gestation. On the one hand, this is considerably later than the
time at which minimal brain function begins. For abortion’s
defenders such a p has the happy consequence of justifying
virtually all abortions that are actually performed. On the
other hand, this candidate for p cannot be justified by
Savulescu’s argument based on the nature of brain death.
The most serious problem, however, concerns people who are
temporarily unconscious. People who are temporarily un-
conscious are people who not only are not conscious (think of
people who are sleeping!) but who cannot be brought to a
state of consciousness. People who cannot now be brought to
a state of consciousness are those who (now) lack the
capacity for consciousness. Since temporarily unconscious
people clearly have the right to life, the capacity for
consciousness (much less consciousness) clearly is not a
necessary condition for the right to life. It is worth noting
that, of course, fetuses are merely temporarily unconscious.
Accordingly, none of the candidates for p offered by Savu-
lescu is a property on the basis of which we can distinguish
those who have the right to life from those who do not. I have
also shown that Savulescu’s criticisms of the future of value
argument are unsuccessful. Does this analysis, then, throw us
into the clutches of the opponents of abortion?
Hardly. For one thing, there may be other successful
criticisms of the future of value argument that have not been
discussed in this essay. I do not think so, of course, but there
is nothing in this essay to show that no criticism of the future
of value argument is successful. In addition, there may be
successful candidates for p that Savulescu did not offer.
Furthermore, I have not addressed the important arguments
that purport to show that even if fetuses have the same full
bodied right to life that you and I have, pregnant women do
not have the obligation to provide them with life support.11
Finally there is another prochoice option to which Savulescu
refers that I have not yet discussed.
Savulescu endorses Jeff McMahan’s account of when we
began to exist. According to McMahan, we began to exist
when the consciousness that is causally connected in a parti-
cular way with our present consciousness began. Therefore,
we began to exist at about 20 weeks of fetal gestation.12
It is important to distinguish McMahan’s view from the
property p view. According to the property p view, we are
(I suppose) biological organisms who existed from the time
of conception or, perhaps, implantation. At one stage in our
early history we acquired a property p that underwrites a
serious right to life. McMahan denies this. He denies that we
are human organisms. On McMahan’s view, we are
essentially conscious beings. We cannot exist in the absence
of consciousness. We are only that part of the brains closely
associated (but not identical) with us that are the physical
basis for our continuing consciousness. Thus I did not begin
to exist at all until at least 20 weeks after conception. Since
the biological organism that I believe I am began to exist
either at conception or at implantation, and since if I were
that biological organism I would have all of the properties of
that biological organism, it follows that I am not a biological
organism (and you are not either, reader). Thus, the
preconscious biological organism that was my precursor did
not have my future of value because that biological organism
was not an earlier phase ofme. Therefore, even if the future of
value argument were correct, it would have been morally
permissible for my mother to have an abortion in her first
20 weeks of pregnancy with the biological organism out of
which I was created (McMahan,12 pp 88–94).
What are we to say of this view? McMahan’s view is based
upon an analysis of the metaphysics of personal identity.
Discussion of this view would take us farther into some very
abstruse issues than, I suspect, readers of this journal would
wish to go, and, in any event, far beyond the confines of a
short response to Savulescu. I believe there are difficulties
with McMahan’s view that are sufficient to reject it, but,
clearly, this is not an argument, but only a promissory note.
My scientific prejudices make it very difficult for me to share
McMahan’s view that I am not a biological organism.
Furthermore, I suspect that readers of this journal with at
least as much background in biology as I will also find it
difficult. Finally, I note that Savulescu’s presentation of
McMahan’s view is ambiguous concerning whether the
McMahan view is a property p view or the robust dualistic
view it actually is. Perhaps this is because Savulescu himself
is unwilling to embrace the radical dualism that McMahan
defends.
I conclude that Savulescu has not shown that the future of
value argument is defective and also has not shown that
there is a viable alternative to it.
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